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Campaign in the South China Sea:
Implications for the Reform of the
United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea
Adam W. Kohl*
ABSTRACT
This Comment discusses the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) with reference to artificial island
building in the South China Sea. China recently began an artificial island building campaign in the Spratly Island chain, which is
located in the South China Sea. These artificial islands have
been the subject of, and have created implications regarding, territorial disputes in the area.
UNCLOS governs international law in the context of disputes among states on the high seas. UNCLOS does have provisions that address artificial island construction and maintenance,
but it mistakenly assumes that states will only construct artificial
islands within their own exclusive economic zone (EEZ). An international arbitral tribunal established by UNCLOS determined
that a state may not build an artificial island within the exclusive
economic zone of another state. In this way, the tribunal interpreted UNCLOS to have a prohibitory rather than permissive
effect when it comes to artificial island construction.
The tribunal’s determination in that case may have legally
resolved that territorial dispute, but it does not provide clear guidance for determining the legitimacy of a state constructing an
artificial island in international waters not within its own EEZ or
an EEZ belonging to another state. This open question is important because several of China’s artificial islands in the South
China Sea fall into that category.
This Comment recommends that UNCLOS be amended by
the state parties to clarify the law of the sea with reference to
* J.D. Candidate, the Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University, 2018.
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artificial islands. Specifically, states should only be allowed to
build artificial islands at a location that is within its own EEZ and
is not located within another state’s EEZ.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, tensions have risen in the South
China Sea over maritime disputes among regional states.1 These
tensions have been exacerbated by China’s construction of several
artificial islands in the region, especially in the Spratly Island
chain.2 China’s neighbors in the region, as well as non-regional
1. China’s Maritime Disputes, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 2017),
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otrmarketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide.
2. Id.
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countries like the United States, are concerned about China’s artificial islands because Chinese control of the islands creates worrisome implications for natural resource allocation, international
commerce, and military control in the region.3
Fortunately, there is a body of international law that addresses
maritime disputes, including the construction and maintenance of
artificial islands: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS or “the Convention”).4 UNCLOS is an international treaty designed to codify international maritime law and
peacefully resolve disputes among states parties.5 This Comment
discusses the law under UNCLOS as well as how UNCLOS interacts with the current maritime disputes in the South China Sea.
Part II will examine the development and substance of UNCLOS.6 Part II will then discuss the competing maritime claims of
the several states that border the South China Sea, the brief history
of China’s artificial island building campaign, and the implications
of China’s artificial islands for states in the region as well as the
international community.7 Part III will analyze the legitimacy of
China’s claim to its artificial islands and the maritime entitlements
that those artificial islands might possess.8 Part III will also critique
aspects of UNCLOS as it applies to the South China Sea disputes
and recommend that UNCLOS be amended to more effectively
deal with ambiguities in the law as it relates to artificial islands.9
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Purpose and Scope of UNCLOS
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was
developed after two United Nations Conferences on the Law of the
Sea were held in Geneva, Switzerland in 1958 and 1960.10 UNCLOS was designed by member-states of the United Nations to
“contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, cooperation and
friendly relations among all nations” as it relates to the conduct of
nations on the high seas.11 The implementation of a uniform rule of
law to govern dispute resolution between nations was also a key
3. Id.
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
5. Id. Preamble, at 25.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. See infra Part III.C.2.
10. UNCLOS, supra note 4, Preamble, at 25.
11. Id.
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motivation behind the creation of UNCLOS.12 Another critical
feature of UNCLOS is its deliberate unbounded geographic scope
of application.13 The Preamble consistently affirms that the Convention’s global reach is necessary to promote a “just and equitable
international economic order,” protect the ocean seabed “irrespective of the geographical location of States,” and secure “economic
and social advancement of all peoples of the world.”14
The authority of the United Nations under UNCLOS to set
policy and resolve disputes is effective over all “States Parties.”15
States Parties are defined as states, “which have consented to be
bound by this Convention and for which this Convention is in
force.”16 Like most forms of public international law, UNCLOS
derives binding authority over a given state because that state affirmatively consents to be so bound.17 Consent in this context is
present when the authorized representative of the state signs and
ratifies the treaty comprising the public international law.18
As of June 16, 2016, 168 states have ratified UNCLOS, including China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.19 Under the
United Nations, Taiwan is not considered its own state, but is referred to, instead, as “Taiwan, Province of China.”20 Because it is
considered to be a political sub-unit of China, Taiwan is neither
considered to be a member of the United Nations nor a signatory of
UNCLOS.21

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. art. 1, at 26.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 11, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
19. Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the
Convention and the Related Agreements, U. N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS & THE
LAW OF THE SEA (Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm [hereinafter Chronological Lists].
20. Y. Frank Chiang, Note, One-China Policy and Taiwan, 28 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2004); see also Taiwan, Province of China Trade Data, U.N. INT’L
TRADE STATISTICS KNOWLEDGEBASE (2010), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/
Knowledgebase/50104/Taiwan-Province-of-China-Trade-data. (referring to Taiwan
as “Taiwan, Province of China”).
21. Greg Torode & J.R. Wu, Taiwan Enters South China Sea Legal Fray, as
Group Seeks to Sway International Court, REUTERS (May 9, 2016), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-taiwan-idUSKCN0Y02LD.
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B. The South China Sea Territorial Dispute
The South China Sea is an expansive body of water bounded
by China and Vietnam to the west, Malaysia to the south, Taiwan to
the north, and the Philippines to the east.22 Each of these four
states and Taiwan assert a territorial claim to some part of the
South China Sea.23 Many of those claims overlap, which has instigated international tension in the area in recent decades.24 China,
the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan all have territorial
claims to a grouping of terrestrial features called the Spratly Islands.25 China, Taiwan, and Vietnam have territorial claims to the
Paracel Islands.26 The Scarborough Shoal is claimed by the Philippines, China, and Taiwan.27 The Pratas Islands are also claimed by
both China and Taiwan.28
Prior to 1969, states in Southeast Asia had little reason to assertively pursue their territorial claims in the South China Sea; the
land formations in the region were largely uninhabitable and had
little to offer to the states that claimed these formations.29 In 1969,
however, the Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for
Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore (COOP) published a report
that adverted to the possibility of large petroleum deposits near terrestrial features in the sea.30 This report prompted the four states
and Taiwan to firmly establish their claims to various terrestrial features in the South China Sea in order to secure exclusive drilling
rights in immediate offshore areas.31 Serious contention over these
terrestrial features continues in the context of offshore drilling

22. Eugene C. LaFond, South China Sea, ENCYCLOPæDIA BRITANNICA (Oct.
3, 2007), https://www.britannica.com/place/South-China-Sea.
23. Bill Hayton, Shadow on the South China Sea, 66 HIST. TODAY 3, 3–4
(2016).
24. Id.
25. Robert Beckman, AGORA: The South China Sea: The UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea and The Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea, 107 A.J.I.L.
142, 144 (2013).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 145.
28. Id.
29. Yann-huei Song, East Asian Seas—Conflicts, Strategies for Peaceful Resolutions and Accomplishments (Panel 1): Conflicting Outer Continental Shelf Claims
in the East and South China Seas: Proposals for Cooperation and Peaceful Resolution, 35 HAW. L. REV. 485, 491–92 (2013).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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rights.32 In fact, a dispute on offshore drilling in the South China
Sea was recently adjudicated in the United States.33
C. Kensho Sone v. Harvest Natural Resources, Inc.
In 2014, several Taiwanese citizens sued a Texas-based American oil and gas company called Harvest Natural Resources, Inc.
(“Harvest”) claiming that the company had infringed upon Taiwan’s sovereign rights.34 China awarded Harvest a concession to
explore an area, known as WAB-21, for oil and gas reserves.35
Taiwanese citizens brought a claim against Harvest for trespassing
within the 200-nautical-mile area off of Taiwan’s coast, which is
known as the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).36 The case was ultimately resolved in favor of Harvest because Taiwan lacked standing
for its claim.37
While, on paper, the case was a dispute between an American
oil company and several Taiwanese citizens, the case was essentially
a proxy for a territorial dispute between Taiwan and China over the
area of the South China Sea in and around WAB-21.38 Specifically,
in its opinion, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas stated: “Although the claims are nominally addressed to
Harvest, [the Taiwanese] are really complaining about China’s aggressive assertion of territorial claims at sea.”39 This dispute is representative of one aspect of territorial contentions generally within
the South China Sea.
D. China’s Claims in the South China Sea
China has claimed sovereign control over all islands and waters
within the South China Sea on the basis of its 2,000-year history of
having “continuously, peacefully and effectively exercised sover32. See, e.g., Stephanie Burnett, China Says Vietnamese Vessels Rammed Its
Boats ‘1,416 Times’, TIME (June 10, 2014), http://time.com/2847104/china-saysvietnamese-vessels-rammed-its-boats-1416-times/.
33. See generally Kensho Sone v. Harvest Nat. Res., Inc., No. H-13-2161, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110138 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2014) (reviewing Taiwanese plaintiffs’
challenge to a Chinese South China Sea concession granted to a Texas-based oil
company).
34. Id. at *4.
35. Id. at *3.
36. Id. at *4.
37. Id. at *6–7.
38. See id. at *7.
39. Id.
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eignty and jurisdiction over them.”40 This claim is represented by
the distinctive “nine-dash line” drawn by Chinese officials on a map
depicting the greater South China Sea area.41 China has not only
claimed existing terrestrial features, however, but has begun constructing artificial islands.42 China has created these islands by
dredging sediment from the seafloor and spraying it atop submerged reefs located within a localized area of the South China Sea
called the Spratly Island chain.43 China treats these artificial islands
as though they were naturally occurring islands and asserts that the
islands carry with them traditional sovereign territorial rights.44
China does not appear to use its artificial islands primarily to secure
claims to natural resources, but rather as a means of enhancing its
strategic military interests in the South China Sea.45
E. Military Implications of China’s Artificial Islands
Various high resolution photos taken by the Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, beginning in 2013, show the efforts of Chinese vessels creating or reclaiming land atop submerged reefs in
several areas of the Spratly Island chain, including the Fiery Cross
Reef, the Johnson South Reef, the Gaven Reef, the Subi Reef, the
Hughes Reef, and the Mischief Reef.46 Construction on top of
these artificial islands is military in nature due to the installation of
radar facilities, airstrips for fighter jets, and ports for Chinese Navy
vessels.47
China’s island building campaign has caught the attention of
the United States and led to military confrontations over the artificial islands.48 The South China Sea contains several sea lanes that
are heavily trafficked by civilian vessels engaged in international
40. China Issues White Paper on Settling Disputes with the Philippines, 65
CHINA TODAY 19, 19 (2016), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/nhbps2016/en/
images/book-en.pdf.
41. Derek Watkins, What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/
asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea-2016.html?_r=0. (“China
has long marked its claim with a “nine-dash line” that skirts the coasts of other
countries.”).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Xinjun Zhang, The Latest Developments of the US Freedom of Navigation
Programs in the South China Sea: Deregulation or Re-balance?, 9 J. OF EAST ASIA
& INT’L L. 167, 173–74 (2016).
45. Watkins, supra note 41.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Zhang, supra note 44, at 173.
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trade.49 Annually, trading vessels carry ship-borne goods totaling
five trillion dollars through the South China Sea.50 In order to protect freedom of movement in international waters in the South
China Sea, the U.S. Navy has challenged the extension of China’s
military control in the area via its artificial islands.51 In 2015, President Barack Obama ordered the Lassen, a guided missile destroyer,
to sail within 12 nautical miles52 of the Subi Reef, which is the location of one of China’s artificial islands in the Spratly Island chain.53
This U.S. Navy action was a part of a protocol called the “Freedom
of Navigation Program,” which was designed to challenge China’s
attempt to restrict international traffic in the South China Sea.54
Beyond seeking to restrict international travel over water in
the South China Sea, China has asserted that its artificial islands
grant China sovereign airspace above those locations it controls in
the area.55 Again, as a challenge to these claims, the United States
flew B-52 bombers over Chinese artificial islands in December
2015.56 The Chinese Defense Ministry condemned the U.S. action
as a violation of China’s sovereign rights as derived from UNCLOS.57 Differing interpretations of maritime law have precipitated these Chinese-American military flashpoints.
F. UNCLOS, Naturally-Formed Oceanic Features, and Artificial
Islands
UNCLOS defines terrestrial features in open water by grouping them into one of three categories: islands, rocks, or low-tide
elevations.58 Under UNCLOS, “islands” are defined as “a natu49. U.S. Warns Against ‘Egregious’ Restrictions in Contested South China
Seas, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2015, 1:56AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ussouthchinasea-usa-china-idUSKCN0S00DE20151006.
50. Id.
51. Helene Cooper, Challenging Chinese Claims, U.S. Sends Warship Near
Artificial Island Chain, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
10/27/world/asia/challenging-chinese-claims-us-sends-warship-near-artificial-island
-chain.html.
52. A nautical mile (“nm”) is defined as “[a] marine mile; a linear measure of
distance on the sea, equivalent to approximately 6,080 feet, the name being taken
from the knots in a ship’s log line.” Nautical mile, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
53. Cooper, supra note 51.
54. Zhang, supra note 44, at 168.
55. Jeremy Page, U.S. Bomber Flies Over Waters Claimed by China, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-jet-flies-over-waters-claimed-bychina-1450466358.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 121, at 66.
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rally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
water at high tide.”59 By contrast, “rocks” are features that meet
the definition of an island but “cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own.”60 Reefs, which are below water at all
times, do not possess the qualities of either an island or a rock and,
therefore, are defined as “low-tide elevations.”61 Low-tide elevations (LTEs) carry extremely limited legal entitlements to states
claiming them as sovereign possessions.62 Artificial islands also
have a unique classification under UNCLOS.63
1. Islands
UNCLOS treats islands as if they were mainland territory:
“The territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone, and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other
land territory.”64 One of the largest advantages of claiming a terrestrial feature to be an “island” is the attachment of a “territorial
sea.”65 “Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”66 This 12-nautical-mile demarcation allows the possessing
state to claim absolute sovereignty within that perimeter.67
Another key advantage to possessing an island is the possessing state’s ability to enforce an EEZ.68 The extent of a state’s EEZ
is defined in UNCLOS as follows: “The exclusive economic zone
shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”69 The EEZ
allows a state the sovereign right to explore and exploit the adjacent 200-nautical-mile area around an island to the exclusion of international vessels.70 A state’s claim of control of an EEZ has
important implications for artificial islands within its limits as well,
as will be explained in Part III.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. art. 13, at 29.
Id.
Id. art. 60, at 45.
Id. art. 121, at 66.
Id.
Id. art. 3, at 27.
Id. art. 2, at 27.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 121, at 66.
Id. art. 57, at 44.
Id. art. 56, at 43.
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2. Rocks
As previously mentioned, “rocks” are features which cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.71 They are
entitled no EEZ or continental shelf.72 They are, however, entitled
to a territorial sea,73 just as full-fledged islands are.74 Most terrestrial features that are consistently above sea level in the South
China Sea are likely considered rocks under this definition, with the
possible exception of the Chinese-claimed “island” of Taiping.75
3. Low-Tide Elevations
LTEs are fully submerged below water at high tide.76 They
arise in the context of UNCLOS because LTEs meet neither the
definition of an “island” nor a “rock,” both of which are defined as
being at least partially above water at high tide.77 LTEs have no
territorial sea of their own, unless they lie within the territorial sea
of the mainland or an island belonging to the same state.78 However, states continue to assert territorial claims over LTEs, especially in the Spratly Islands.79 Despite these claims, if the LTE in
question is not within 12 nautical miles of an island or the mainland,
the claiming state is afforded no associated sovereign rights under
international law.80
4. Artificial Islands
UNCLOS contemplates states constructing artificial islands
only within a legitimate EEZ belonging to that state.81 UNCLOS
states: “In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have
the exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the
construction, operation and use of: (a) artificial islands . . . .”82 Ar71. Id. art. 121, at 66.
72. Id.
73. Id. art. 2, at 27 (“The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its
land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its
archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.”).
74. Yann-huei Song, Taiping Island: An Island or a Rock under UNCLOS,
ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (May 7, 2015), https://amti.csis.org/
taiping-island-an-island-or-a-rock-under-unclos/.
75. Id.
76. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 13, at 29.
77. Id. art. 121, at 66.
78. Id. art. 13, at 29.
79. Beckman, supra note 25, at 143–44.
80. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 13, at 29.
81. Id. art. 60(1), at 45.
82. Id.
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tificial islands emphatically do not possess a territorial sea.83 They
do, however, possess what is called a “safety zone.”84 Safety zones
allow a controlling state to establish a 500-meter radius in which a
state can exert exclusive sovereign control.85 Moreover, the plain
language of UNCLOS indicates that states do not have the right to
construct artificial islands in areas outside of its EEZ.86
One other legal implication of artificial island construction is
the notice requirement.87 UNCLOS states: “Due notice must be
given of the construction of such artificial islands, installations or
structures, and permanent means for giving warning of their presence must be maintained.”88 This provision is designed to protect
unsuspecting foreign vessels from running aground when sailing
within the EEZ of another state.89
Because each type of feature receives different legal treatment,
determining the UNCLOS classification of a particular feature is
critical when seeking to determine a country’s UNCLOS rights and
obligations, given its maritime claims.
III. ANALYSIS
UNCLOS reserves separate treaty sections to address the legal
implication of claiming an island, rock, LTE, or artificial island.90
However, the Convention does not indisputably determine whether
an artificial island constructed atop a rock or LTE retains the legal
entitlements of the underlying feature or exclusively adopts the legal entitlements defined for an artificial island.91 To address this
question in the context of the South China Sea dispute, this Comment will briefly evaluate the entitlements of China’s artificial islands in the Spratly Island chain.92
A separate section of this Comment will address the implications of artificial island construction within and outside a state’s
83. Id. art. 60(8), at 45.
84. Id. art. 60(4-5), at 45.
85. Id.
86. Id. art. 60(1), at 45.
87. Id. art. 60(3), at 45.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 121, at 66.
91. See Clive Schofield, The Trouble with Islands: The Definition and Role of
Islands and Rocks in Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in 65 MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 19, 24 (Martinus Nijhoff ed., 2009) (“Island-building activities on the part of states, in an effort
to enhance their claims to maritime space by creating new islands, is therefore
contrary to the Convention.”).
92. See infra Part III.A.1.
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EEZ.93 Artificial islands are referred to under UNCLOS only in
the context of construction within a state’s EEZ.94 One Chineseclaimed terrestrial feature in the Spratly Island chain could arguably be classified as an island under UNCLOS.95 This Comment will
evaluate the likely classification of this terrestrial feature and what
impact that determination would have on the legitimacy of China’s
artificial islands in the surrounding area.96
Through this analysis, this Comment will elucidate the shortcomings of UNCLOS as it has been applied to China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea.
A. Implications of Terrestrial Features Underlying Chinese
Artificial Islands
1. Underlying Features Approach
The artificial islands that China has constructed in the South
China Sea are likely built atop either rocks or LTEs.97 Artificial
islands under UNCLOS do not have territorial seas or EEZs of
their own.98 However, some scholars have posited that China may
continue to assert the legal entitlements attached to those underlying features even though the features are now entirely covered
under the surface of the artificial islands.99 Following this “underlying feature” approach, a case-by-case analysis is needed to determine the status of each artificial island in question.
The major artificial islands in question are the Fiery Cross
Reef, the Johnson South Reef, the Gaven Reef, the Subi Reef, the
Hughes Reef, and the Mischief Reef.100 The Fiery Cross Reef, the
Johnson South Reef, and the Gaven Reef are all built atop a terrestrial feature that, at least in part, is considered a rock for the purposes of UNCLOS.101 On the other hand, the Subi Reef, the
Hughes Reef, and the Mischief Reef are all built atop LTEs.102
This dichotomy leads to the odd result that a subset of China’s arti93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See infra Part III.A.2.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 60(1), at 45.
Song, supra note 74.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See Gregory Poling, The Legal Challenge of China’s Island Building, ASIA
MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Feb. 18, 2015), http://amti.csis.org/the-le
gal-challenge-of-chinas-island-building/.
98. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 60(8), at 45.
99. Poling, supra note 97.
100. Watkins, supra note 41.
101. Daniel Andreeff, Note, Legal Implications of China’s Land Reclamation
Projects in the Spratly Islands, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 855, 897 (2015).
102. Id.
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ficial islands in the Spratly Island chain will be nearly identical in
attribute and purpose, but will garner differing entitlements under
UNCLOS.103 Specifically, the first set of artificial islands built atop
rocks will each have a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.104 The second set, however, will have no protection under UNCLOS unless it
is within the territorial sea of another Chinese-claimed rock.105
For those artificial islands that are built upon rocks, another
issue may arise in applying the territorial sea via the underlying feature approach. If the territorial sea of the rock-based artificial islands is truly derived from, and measured by, the existence and
discrete location of underlying rocks, it stands to reason that the
territorial sea will remain fixed despite the construction or expansion of an artificial island.106 In fact, UNCLOS states that the presence of an artificial island “does not affect the delimitation of the
territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental
shelf.”107
Given this information, a portion of an artificial island’s coast
lying 11 nautical miles from the rock upon which the artificial island
was originally constructed would be surrounded by only a one-nautical-mile territorial sea. At the same time, a portion of the artificial island’s coast directly adjacent to the underlying rock would be
surrounded by the full 12-nautical-mile territorial sea. This absurd
result emerges when applying the legal entitlements of underlying
features in the context of artificial islands. This result tends to indicate that this approach is an improper application of UNCLOS.
2. Article 60 Approach
A more reasoned approach sees Article 60 as the sole authority on legal entitlements due to artificial islands under UNCLOS.108
While the term “artificial island” is not itself defined in UNCLOS,
each of the Chinese artificial islands has the defining feature of being built atop some other existing terrestrial feature.109 In Article
60, the framers of UNCLOS seem to have contemplated artificial
islands of this sort because they felt compelled to disclaim that
“[a]rtificial islands . . . do not possess the status of islands.”110 This
disclaimer implies that both regular islands and artificial islands are
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id.
Id.
See id. at 897, 900.
See Poling, supra note 97.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 60(8), at 45.
Id. art. 60, at 45.
Andreeff, supra note 101, at 898.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 60(8), at 45.
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thought to be “area[s] of land, surrounded by water, which [are]
above water at high tide,” with the distinguishing feature being that
regular islands must be “naturally formed.”111
If the framers did indeed contemplate that artificial islands
were to be made of some kind of land material, it follows that the
framers understood that artificial islands must be built upon something. In this case, it would make little sense for the framers to
create a rule for legal entitlements belonging to artificial islands,
but nevertheless maintain a belief that entitlements of artificial islands would be defined by the rules attached to each separate island’s underlying feature. Moreover, because Article 60 deals
comprehensively with the application of rules governing artificial
islands in several contexts, the framers of UNCLOS likely did not
intend the legal entitlements affecting artificial islands to be governed by some unrelated section of the Convention.
B. Taiping Island and EEZ Implications
Taiping Island is the largest of the naturally occurring features
in the Spratly Island chain.112 The Taiwanese Navy first sailed to
Taiping Island in 1946, and Taiwan has administrated the island
since 1956.113 China, however, asserts a claim to Taiping Island and
does not recognize Taiwan’s claim to the island.114 Again, because
Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations or a signatory to
UNCLOS, only China’s claim to the island has been tested by the
dispute resolution mechanism of UNCLOS.115
1. Is Taiping an “Island” Under UNCLOS?
Under Article 121, UNCLOS distinguishes between “rocks”
and “islands” on the basis of whether features in question can “sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.”116 Scholars
have suggested that in order to meet this requirement, a state must
demonstrate that the feature can permanently support human
habitation for at least 50 people.117 At this point, no doubt exists
that Taiping Island can permanently support human habitation of
more than 150 people.118 Physically, Taiping as an “island has a
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Poling, supra note 97.
Song, supra note 74.
Id.
Id.
Torode & Wu, supra note 21.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 121, at 66.
Song, supra note 74.
Id.
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long and narrow shape that is low and flat, approximately 1,290
[meters long] and 366 [meters wide.]”119 Moreover, Taiping currently has a population of 200 people comprised solely of military
personnel from the Taiwanese Coast Guard, Navy, and Air
Force.120 Under this interpretation, then, Taiping appears to meet
the UNCLOS definition of a regular island.
A separate approach, however, calls into question the legitimacy of Taiping’s island status because Taiwan’s use of the island
does not seem to accord with the spirit of the Convention.121 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: “A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.”122 Applying this language in the context of UNCLOS, the element of the treaty requiring permanent human habitation should be interpreted to mean
that stable communities of people actually live on the island.123
Consequently, giving island status to a feature when a state stations
military personnel thereon for the purpose of establishing coastal
EEZs would be an improper application of UNCLOS.124
A determination of the correct status of Taiping Island under
UNCLOS is a question of Convention interpretation that must be
resolved by binding arbitration or the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea.125 The tribunal’s decision has important implications for the protections afforded to China’s artificial islands in the
Spratly Island chain.
2. China’s Potential EEZ in the Spratly Islands
Taiping Island’s classification as a naturally formed island
would have immense legal consequences with reference to the dispute over China’s artificial islands in the Spratly Island chain. Naturally formed islands fitting the language of Article 121 of
UNCLOS are given identical maritime rights as mainland territory.126 Therefore, if Taiping Island were deemed a naturally
formed island it would have, among other things, a 12-nautical-mile
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
10, 1982,
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 31, at 340.
Song, supra note 74.
Id.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex VI art. 1, Dec.
1833 U.N.T.S. 397, at 166.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 121, at 66.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\122-3\DIK301.txt

932

unknown

Seq: 16

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

25-JUN-18

11:44

[Vol. 122:917

territorial sea and a 200nm EEZ, as provided by UNCLOS.127 The
12nm territorial sea would no doubt be of benefit to the Taiwanese
who administrate the island, but the 200nm EEZ would be particularly beneficial to China because this EEZ would strengthen the
legitimacy of China’s several artificially constructed islands in the
neighboring area.
Specifically, UNCLOS provides that a state has the exclusive
right to construct and regulate artificial islands within its 200nm
EEZs.128 If Taiping Island were found to have an EEZ, each of
China’s current six artificial islands in the Spratly Island chain
would fall within that area.129 It would appear, then, that China has
constructed and maintained its artificial islands lawfully according
to UNCLOS. As will be discussed in the next section, however, an
UNCLOS tribunal has ruled against China’s claim that its artificial
islands fall within a Chinese EEZ created by virtue of their ownership of Taiping Island.
C. UNCLOS Permanent Court of Arbitration 2016 Decision
On January 22, 2013, the Philippines submitted its South China
Sea dispute with the People’s Republic of China to UNCLOS’s
binding arbitration mechanism for resolution.130 UNCLOS provides for, under Articles 286 and 287 of the Convention, the authority of one state to submit a claim for dispute resolution with
UNCLOS’s Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”).131 China,
however, refused to participate in the arbitration and similarly refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the PCA, but the PCA determined that it did have jurisdiction over the dispute and entered an
award in the matter on July 12, 2016.132
1. Issues Resolved by the PCA
The PCA issued a comprehensive 479-page decision that resolved several controversies arising from competing interpretations
127. Id. art. 3, at 27; id. art. 58, at 44.
128. Id. art. 60(1), at 45.
129. See Distance Calculator, DAFTLOGIC, https://www.daftlogic.com/
projects-google-maps-distance-calculator.htm (depicting the approximate displacement between Taiping Island each of China’s six artificial islands as follows: Mischief Reef 77nm; Gaven Reef 13nm; Fiery Cross Reef 96nm; Subi Reef 37nm;
Johnson Reef 40nm; and; Hughes Reef 29nm).
130. In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Phl./Chn.), PCA Case
N° 2013-19, Award, UNCLOS Permanent Court of Arbitration, ¶ 28 (July 12,
2016), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712Award.pdf [hereinafter South China Sea Arbitration].
131. Id.
132. Id. ¶ 60.
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of UNCLOS.133 The decision only addressed issues between the
Philippines and China, however, and did not seek to resolve extraneous ambiguities arising under the Convention.134
The first major issue that the PCA resolved was the question of
Taiping Island’s legal status and corresponding maritime entitlements under UNCLOS.135 To the chagrin of Taiwan and China, the
PCA decided that Taiping Island is in fact a rock under the UNCLOS classification regime.136 The PCA arrived at this conclusion
largely because Taiping Island is reliant upon Taiwan for personnel,
basic living essentials, and food.137 In other words, because Taiping
Island was incapable of self-sufficiently providing for a stable community of inhabitants, it fell under UNCLOS as a rock rather than a
naturally occurring island.
This result, of course, means that Taiping Island is entitled to a
12nm territorial sea, but not to a 200nm EEZ.138 As a result, the
PCA found that China had no claim to any maritime features that
would provide China with an EEZ in the area of the Spratly Island
chain.139 In turn, China’s current six artificially constructed islands
in the area do not exist within a Chinese EEZ, leaving China without authority pursuant to Article 60 of UNCLOS to maintain and
regulate those artificial islands.140
The second major issue resolved by the PCA flows from the
PCA’s determination of Taiping Island to be a rock. The PCA decided that China had violated the rights of the Philippines under
UNCLOS by constructing and maintaining its artificial island at
Mischief Reef.141
Mischief Reef is the closest of China’s artificial islands to the
Philippines’s Palawan Island, clearly within the 200nm coastal EEZ
of the Philippines.142 While China’s artificial islands at Johnson
Reef and Hughes Reef also appear to be within the Philippines’s
200nm coastal EEZ, the PCA did not address those locations.143
Interestingly, the PCA treated Article 60 of UNCLOS as having a prohibitive rather than permissive effect; instead of deciding
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See generally id.
See generally id.
Id. ¶ 625.
Id. ¶ 632; see also Torode & Wu, supra note 21.
South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case N° 2013-19, ¶ 622.
Song, supra note 74.
South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case N° 2013-19, ¶ 626.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 60(1), at 45.
South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case N° 2013-19, ¶ 1203.
DAFTLOGIC, supra note 129.
Id.
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that the construction and regulation of artificial islands is only permissible within the acting state’s EEZ, the PCA decided the converse.144 Rather, the PCA decided that it was prohibited, according
to Article 60, to construct and maintain an artificial island within an
area that falls solely within the EEZ of a separate state.145 The
PCA arrived at this decision because it found that China operating
its artificial island at Mischief Reef within the Philippines’s coastal
EEZ infringed upon the Philippines’s ability “to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of” artificial islands.146
The PCA’s determination as to Taiping Island’s UNCLOS classification bears on the artificial island dispute because, if Taiping
Island were found to be a naturally formed island pursuant to Article 121, China would have an EEZ extending over the area surrounding Mischief Reef, overlapping the Philippines’s coastal
EEZ.147 When two or more coastal states have opposite or adjacent overlapping maritime entitlements, they must go through a
process called “delimitation” to establish a border between each
state’s entitlement.148 Delimitation, however, has special procedures, including a provision that allows a state to make a declaration taking resolution of disputes over delimitation out of the
PCA’s subject matter jurisdiction.149 China had successfully made
such a declaration in 2006.150
If the PCA had decided that China was entitled to an EEZ
within the Spratly Island chain pursuant to its claim over Taiping
Island as a naturally formed island, then the PCA would no longer
have had the jurisdiction to resolve the dispute over China’s operation of its artificial island at Mischief Reef.151
2. Open Question Remains After the PCA’s Decision
As mentioned, PCA review of competing interpretations of
UNCLOS unrelated to the dispute between China and the Philippines was outside the scope of the PCA’s 2016 decision and, therefore, was not addressed in the PCA’s July 12, 2016 decision.152 One
important open question remaining after the PCA’s decision is
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case N° 2013-19, ¶ 1203.
Id.
Id.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 121, at 66.
South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case N° 2013-19, ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
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what the correct treatment of China’s other five artificial islands
should be.153
The PCA’s decision gives some guidance, but it fails to directly
address the issue.154 In fact, sections of the PCA’s decision seem to
provide conflicting interpretations of artificial islands generally
under UNCLOS.155 Specifically, the PCA seemed to resolve the
controversy regarding the “underlying features” approach and the
“Article 60” approach to the treatment of artificial islands under
UNCLOS.156 At one point, the PCA reasoned that, “[a]s with the
other high-tide features that have been the subject of construction
and reclamation work, the status of a feature for the purpose of
Article 121(3) is to be assessed on the basis of its natural condition,
prior to human modification.”157 This reasoning suggests that a
state is entitled to maritime entitlements with reference to an artificial island only on the basis of the underlying feature upon which
the artificial island was built.
The PCA’s decision with respect to Mischief Reef, however,
adds complexity to the issue. The PCA first determined that Mischief Reef was an LTE and, as a result, possessed the maritime entitlements of an LTE.158 Yet, later, the PCA determined that China
was in violation of its UNCLOS obligations specifically because
China was operating Mischief Reef as an artificial island within the
Philippines’s coastal EEZ.159 This determination was based not on
Article 121, but rather on Article 60, the provision of UNCLOS
that deals comprehensively with artificial islands.160
In order to reconcile these seemingly incompatible determinations, it appears that artificial islands must take differing treatment
under UNCLOS based on their geographic context. In this way,
Mischief Reef seems to be treated as an artificial island because it
lies within the Philippines’s coastal EEZ. The corollary, of course,
would be that Mischief Reef would not be treated as an artificial
island, but instead as an LTE, if it were situated outside any state’s
coastal EEZ.
Carrying this application through to China’s other artificial islands presents a logical quagmire. Gaven Reef, Fiery Cross Reef,
Subi Reef, Johnson Reef, and Hughes Reef may fall outside of any
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See generally id.
See generally id.
See id. ¶¶ 568, 1203.
Id. ¶ 568.
Id.
South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case N° 2013-19, ¶ 1040.
Id. ¶¶ 568, 1203.
Id. ¶ 1203.
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state’s coastal EEZ; exact EEZ delimitations have not been resolved in the South China Sea.161 Given the PCA’s determination
that artificial islands be treated in accordance with their underlying
feature,162 China is saddled with the proposition that those artificial
islands built atop rocks are entitled to a 12nm territorial sea, while
those that are built atop LTEs have no maritime entitlements whatsoever.163 For example, China’s artificial island at Subi Reef is built
atop an LTE, providing it no maritime entitlements.164 Moreover,
if artificial islands lying outside a coastal EEZ do not receive Article 60 treatment, China’s Subi Reef artificial island would also not
enjoy the 500-meter safety zone that attaches to artificial islands.165
This result would lead to the bizarre scenario where a U.S. guided
missile destroyer could lawfully sail up to the beach of China’s artificial island at Subi Reef, but would be required by UNCLOS to
remain 12nm back from Gaven Reef’s underlying feature, which is
a rock.
Without doubt, this approach is an illogical way to resolve UNCLOS’s ambiguities with respect to artificial islands in the South
China Sea. Moreover, China’s refusal to accept the PCA’s determination with reference to China’s dispute with the Philippines leaves
real questions over whether UNCLOS has the teeth to effectively
resolve complex and heated disputes over artificial island construction in the South China Sea.166
The conclusions reached by the PCA demonstrate the weaknesses within UNCLOS, especially as they relate to ambiguities
over artificial island construction outside of an EEZ. A prudent
solution to this problem would be to amend UNCLOS to outlaw
state parties from building or maintaining artificial islands anywhere apart from maritime locations indisputably within a state’s
own EEZ. As discussed, China seems unwilling to accept the judgment of the PCA, so a reform of UNCLOS will be unlikely to ameliorate maritime disputes involving China in the South China
161. See Kevin Baumert & Brian Melchior, Maritime Claims in the South
China Sea, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 18 (2014), https://www.state.gov/documents/organ
ization/234936.pdf.
162. South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case N° 2013-19, ¶ 568.
163. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 121, at 66.
164. Andreeff, supra note 101, at 898.
165. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 60(4–5), at 44.
166. Jane Perlez, Philippines v. China: Q. and A. on South China Sea Case,
N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/world/asia/southchina-sea-philippines-hague.html (“While the decision is binding, the tribunal has
no power to enforce it, and no one expects that China will volunteer to dismantle
its artificial islands and return the sand to the ocean floor.”).
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Sea.167 Clarifying the law, however, will undoubtedly benefit the
international community when similar disputes over artificial islands arise in the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
China’s artificial island building campaign has exacerbated international tensions in the South China Sea over the past several
years.168 This campaign has enflamed maritime disputes among
states that border the South China Sea and tested UNCLOS’s ability to effectively resolve those disputes.169 Despite UNCLOS having contemplated states constructing artificial islands, the
Convention leaves much to be desired in terms of how the law determines the legitimacy and entitlements of artificial islands.170
UNCLOS operates ineffectively when a state constructs an artificial
island outside its own EEZ or that of another state.171 China’s construction of several artificial islands in the Spratly Island chain has
highlighted that exact shortcoming.172 In order to effectively resolve this dilemma in the context of future disputes over artificial
island construction involving states willing to abide by UNCLOS,
the state parties should amend UNCLOS to prohibit a state from
constructing or maintaining an artificial island outside of its own
uncontested EEZ.173
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